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III.THE BEHAVIOR OF SECTOR VELOCITIES
VELOCITY BY GEOGRAPHIC SECTORS
From the beginning of the deposit turnover series in 1919, the
Federal Reserve System has published separate estimates for New
York City, other leading centers, and all other reporting centers.°
The principal value of this crude three-sector breakdown is that it
permits partial isolation of the influence of financial activity and of
large corporate accounts. For instance, deposit turnover rose much
more in New York than in the other two sectors during the 1920's,
because the intense securities speculation of the period generated a
particularly large volume of debits against New York checking
accounts.'°
Examination of Chart 2 and Table 1 (part B) reveals a similar
phenomenon for the period since World War II. Deposit turnover
rose nearly twice as fast in New York as in the "six other centers"
and "other centers" during 1946—5 8. Aggregate deposit turnover
rose at a slightly higher rate than turnover in these last two catego-
ries, but at a much lower rate than in New York. New York deposit
turnover rose even during the war and at about the same rate as it
has since 1946, while the turnover in the "other centers" sector fell
sharply. Chart 2 illustrates another significant point. New York de-
posit turnover has been more than twice that of the "other centers"
sector since 1954, and about one and two-thirds that of the "six
other centers" sector.
These relationships between sector and aggregate changes have
been influenced by substantial shifts in weights since 1943 (Table
A-4). As mentioned in Section I, weights are the fractions of the
money stock held by each sector." The effect on aggregate de-
9. The estimates for 1919—41 (Banking and Monetary Statistics, p. 254)arenot en-
tirely comparable with those for 1943 to date. The earlier series include, while the later
series exclude, federal government debits and deposits. Furthermore, for 1919—41 "other
leading centers" means the 100 cities (other than New York) included in the weekly
reporting member-bank series, and the "all other reporting centers" turnover rate is an
estimate of demand deposit velocity at allotherbanks. Since 1943 the former has been
replaced by a "six other centers" series, and the latter by a "337 other centers" series.
See also notes to Table A-3.
10. The behavior o.f deposit turnover series during this period is discussed in con-
siderable detail in James W. Angell, The Behavior of Money (New York, 1936), chap. iv.
11. This can be demonstrated as follows:
V =S/M =s1/M+s2/M+... (1)
where V is aggregate velocity, S total spending by all sectors,spending by the ith
sector, n the number of sectors, and M the total money stock. Multiplying the numeratorCHART 2
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positturnover of New York's sharp rise in turnover was partly off-
set by the steady fall in the fraction of bank deposits held in New
York. This fall was absorbed mostly by a rise in the fraction held
in "other centers." The fraction in the "six other centers," category,
which fell slightly during the war, has been virtually constant since
1946. If there had been no shift in weights since 1946, the observed
increases in sector turnovers would have raised aggregate turnover
to a level 4.8 per cent above its actual 1957 level.
Taken by itself, this geographic breakdown of deposit turnover
tells little about the forces responsible for the postwar velocity rise.
It does make clear, however, that the rise in turnover has been
broadly based, rather than confined to one or two sectors, and that
shifts in weights have tended to retard, rather than to intensify, the
upward trend. True, deposit turnover rose more rapidly in New
York City than elsewhere, but the more general problem remains:
Why did velocity rise in all sectors?
VELOCITY BY FLOW-OF-FUNDS SECTORS
In 1956 the Federal Reserve System, building.on Copeland's pio-
neering work at the National Bureau of Economic pub-
lished a new set of social accounts giving estimates of sources and
uses of funds for the entire economy, by major transactor groups.
These flow-of-funds accounts are now available for the period 1939—
The inclusion of sector year-end cash holdings in these ac-
counts makes computation of sector velocities a simple matter.'4
The sector velocities shown in Chart 3 are ratios of annual non-
financial uses to averages of beginning- and end-of-year demand de-
and denominator of each term in equation (1) by the relevant sector money holdings
(,n1, ... in,,),we obtain
V =(s1/ in1 -mj/A?f)—i-- ( s2/ m2/Ivf)—I--... ( in,,in,,/Af).(2 )
Each term of equation (2) consists of the product of a sector velocity timesits
weight (mi/Al).
12.Op.cit.
13. It appears that the Federal Reserve will not extend the annual gross-flow accounts
(which are necessary for velocity analysis of the kind presented here) beyond 1956;
quarterly net-flow accounts have been prepared for the period 1952 to date (see "A
Quarterly Presentation of Flow of Funds and Saving," Federal Reserve Bulletin,
August, 1959).
14. This does not mean that these velocities are beyond reproach statistically. The
year-end sector cash holdings, particularly by the non-corporate business sector, can be
taken only as rough estimates; and the velocity numerators vary greatly in degree of
grossness, as well as in reliability.7
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posits and currency for each sector.15 I have excluded the "bank
ing" and "rest of world" sectors and have combined the "farm" and
"unincorporated business" sectors. This leaves the following seven
sectors: consumer, corporate business, non-corporate business, fed-
eral government, state and local government, insurance, and other
investors. The latter two have been omitted from the chart. As indi-
cated in Section II, the ratio of non-financial uses of all sectors to
total money is an aggregate velocity measure designated as non-
financial velocity; this also is plotted in Chart 3. Table 1 (part C)
gives annual growth rates for these sector velocities in the postwar
period.
The chart brings out strikingly the contrast between wartime and
postwar velocity movements already evident in Chart 1. From 1939
to 1941 velocity rose in some sectors and fell in others; after 1941,
falling velocity became the order of the day. The declines were
much sharper for the federal, consumer, and non-corporate sectors
than for the corporate sector. State and local velocity also fell sub-
stantially, though not so much as consumer velocity.
The postwar period, on the other hand, has been characterized by
a pronounced upsurge of velocity. For every sector, the 1939—45
peak value had been exceeded by 1955 and as early as 1947 for the
corporatesector.1° Except forotherinvestors, whose velocity
reached a postwar peak in 1950, and the federal government, whose
velocity has moved erratically, the rises have been remarkably
steady throughout 1946—56. Even federal velocity has not been far
out of line since 1947 (see Table 1), and its extremely low value in
1946 is largely the result of the huge sums obtained through the
Eighth War Loan in December, 1945. This confirms the finding of
the preceding subsection that velocity has risen throughout the
economy since the end of the war—in business, household, and pub-
lic sectors alike.
The most obvious differences among sectors are in velocity levels.
15.Twovariants of consumer velocity were computed. One takes total non-financial
uses for this group of transactors, while the other deducts withheld federal income and
• social insurance taxes. The latter seems clearly the more appropriate concept, since
withheld taxes do not constitute payments of a sort that give rise to the holdings of
cash by consumers.
E. T. Weiler has computed sector velocities from flow of funds. See his "The Flow of
Funds and Monetary Theory," in American Statistical Association, Proceedings of the
Business and Economic Statistics Section, 1955—56,pp.52—58. In addition, the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago, in a forthcoming velocity study, presents flow-of-funds sector
velocities for 1950—56.
16. For the consumer sector the statement in the text is correct only when withheld
taxes are included in the velocity numerator.494 Postwar Rise in the Velocity of Money
In 1956, for instance, corporate velocity was 1,34 times federal ve-
locity, 1.44 times non-corporate velocity, 1.37 times insurance ve-
locity, 2.88 times consumer velocity (excluding withheld taxes),
3.86 times state and local velocity, and 6.89 times velocity.in the
other investors sector. Another difference is in the degree of cyclical
variability of sector velocities. Although both consumer and non-
corporate velocity experienced reduced rates of growth in 1949 and
1954, the decline in aggregate velocity during these recession years
resulted solely from sharply falling velocity in the corporate sector.
The fall in velocity during World War II, on the other hand, oc-
curred in all sectors (except insurance) but was much more severe
for consumers (especially when withheld taxes are excluded) than
for corporate business. Finally, the corporate and other investors
velocities have been lagging since 1946, their rates of increase being
only about half those of the consumer and non-corporate sectors.
Among flow-of-funds sectors, the consumer sector has consistently
been most important as a holder of money. The fraction of total
money held by this sector rose slightly during 1939—45 and
during the next two years. Since then it has varied within the nar-
row range of 37—41 per cent (Table A-6). The corporate and non-
corporate sectors have been next in importance. Except for the fed-
eral sector, whose share rose and fell dramatically during 1942—47,
no other sector has accounted for more than 9 per cent of total money
since 1946. The postwar increase in the corporate share has been
offset by a nearly corresponding decrease in the non-corporate share.
Since corporate is substantially higher than non-corporate velocity,
this change has tended to increase aggregate velocity. The increased
share of the other investors and state and local sectors has had the
opposite effect.
In total, these postwar shifts in weights had virtually no effect.
Application of 1946 weights to the 1956 sector velocities yields an
aggregate velocity figure nine-tenths of 1 per cent above that actu-
ally recorded in This result reinforces a conclusion of the
preceding subsection: shifts in sector weights have reduced, rather
than increased, velocity since 1946.
CORPORATE VELOCITIES FROM Statistics of Inc oinc
Although the seven-sector breakdown of the flow-of-funds accounts
adds significantly to our understanding of aggregate velocity, more de-
tailed information would be desirable. It would be interesting, for
17. If 1947 or 194S weights are used in this comparison, computed aggregate velocity
in 1956 is 1.7 per cent below the recorded figure.Postwar Rise in the Velocity of Money 495
example, to obtain velocities for consumers by income, occupation,
age, and other classes. While the required data are totally lacking
for consumers, there is much additional information which yields
useful approximations to velocity ratios for corporate subsectors. In
general, all that is needed for such "velocity" computations are
balance sheets and income statements for groups of firms. These are
available from several sources.'8 Only the annual Statistics of In-
come is used here.
The velocities from Statistics of Income are ratios of total outlays,
including tax and dividend payments but excluding capital expendi-
tures, debt retirement, and securities purchases, to year-end cash
holdings. The omission of capital expenditures is the only important
conceptual difference between these estimates and those already dis-
cussed. Since the corporate velocity estimates from Statistics of In-
come conform closely to those from flow-of-funds accounts through-
out 1939—56, it appears that conceptual differences are relatively
unimportant.
Statistics of Income contains the ingredients for the construction
of several hundred sector velocities.19 For recent years these sectors
consist of seven broad industry divisions (agriculture, forestry, and
fishery; mining and quarrying; construction; manufacturing; pub-
lic utility; trade; and service); fifty-four major industry groups;
and ten asset-size classes for each of the foregoing. We shall examine
velocity only for the seven industry divisions, selected major indus-
try groups, and size classes for all corporations (except finance) and
four major industry groups.
1. Major industry divisions.—Velocities for selected major in-
dustry divisions and for all non-financial corporations, 1931—57, are
shown in Chart 4•20Afterestablishing troughs in 1932 or 1933, in
each division (other than the service division), velocity rose to 1937,
fell from 1937 to 1940, rose in 1941, and fell from 1941 to 1943.
During the postwar period Chart 4 resembles Charts 2 and 3: each
18. U.S. Treasury Department, Statistics of Income (Washington, annually); U.S.
Federal Trade Commission—Securities and Exchange Commission, Quarterly Financial
Report for Manufacturing Corporations (Washington, quarterly); Robert Morris Asso-
ciates, Statement Studies (Philadelphia, annually) ; and reports of individual firms.
19. There are numerous problems in the use of these tabulations for velocity estimates.
For instance, they referfiscal years of reporting firms rather than to calendar years;
time deposits and perhaps even marketable securities in some cases are included in
"cash"; classification of diversified firms in a single industry class is highly artificial;
and, as noted in the text, capital expenditures are entirely ignored. In addition, because
the universe of reporting firms with balance sheets is not identical in every year, we
have relied solely on year-end cash figures rather than averages of beginning- and end-
of-year cash.
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sector velocity experienced a net rise; the rates of rise, for the most
part, are similar (average growth rates are presented in Table A-i);
and, as was true throughout the prewar period, there are great abso-
lute velocity differences. Manufacturing velocity is very close to
that of all non-financial corporations in level, trend, and year-to-
year movements. Trade velocity, though much higher, and mining
velocity, though the lowest, move in similar fashion. In the other
four industry divisions, velocity behaves with less regularity: serv-
ice, agriculture, and construction velocities lagged behind the all-
corporation trend, while public utility velocity rose much more rap-
idly. Once again we find that higher velocity has been a very general
postwar phenomenon.
Weight shifts have been negligible among major industry divi-
sions since 1946 (Table A-8). Manufacturing has consistently ac-
counted for slightly over half of all cash held by non-financial cor-
porations, and trade for 2 2—23 per cent. The shares of the service
and construction industries have grown, while the share of the pub-
lic utility industry has declined. However, the weighted average of
1956 sector velocities is the same, whether 1946 or 1956 weights are
used. It is clear, therefore, that the postwar rise in corporate veloc-
ity is wholly the result of velocity rises within corporate industry
divisions.
2. Major industry groups.—Charts SA and 5B show velocities
over the period 1946—56 for ten of the fifty-four major industry
groups included in Statistics of Income, as well as for two broader
categories—retail and wholesale trade. I have also computed ye-
locities for thirty-two other major industry groups over this period.
All forty-four series are presented in Table A-9; annual growth
rates may be found in Table A-I.
These series provide additional evidence of the generality of the
postwar velocity rise; only automotive repair services failed to in-
crease over the period as a whole. However, the annual growth rates
differ widely, varying from less than zero for one trade group and
three services groups2' to 13.1 per cent for automotive dealers and
filling stations and 11.4 per cent for motor vehicles. Since 1951 the
velocity trends of beverages, personal services, and food and kin-
dred products have been downward. Retail-trade velocity, on the
other hand, has risen almost without interruption throughout the
postwar period.
21. Retail food trade, business services, personal services, and automobile repair
services. Except for the last 1956 velocities exceeded 1946valuesdespite the nega-
tive growth rate.CHART 5A
CORPORATE VELOCITIES, SELECTED MAJOR INDUSTRY GROUPS, 1946_56*
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Two other points are worth noting. Analysis of Charts SA and 5B
and thirty-two uncharted series reinforces the impression derived
from Chart 4 that cyclical rises and falls in velocity are common to
nearly all segments of business. Also, the differences in velocity lev-
els by industry groups correspond broadly to the differences by in-
dustry divisions shown in Chart 4.
3. Size classes.—As I have already indicated, corporate data
from Statistics of Income are classified by size of total assets as well
as by industry. We know from Lutz's study of the interwar period
that velocity is probably an inverse function of firm size.22 Con-
ceivably, changes in average firm size could explain the rising trend
of corporate velocity; in any event, differences in the behavior of
velocity among the various size classes may provide clues to the na-
ture of the postwar velocity rise.
Chart 6 shows size-class velocities for all non-financial corpora-
tions for 1939, 1941, 1943, and 1946_57.23Onceagain it is clear
that the postwar velocity rise has been broadly based, rising during
1946—57 in all ten size classes. There are some noteworthy differ-
ences among these classes in pattern of change and in velocity lev-
els, particularly when the prewar and wartime data are taken into
account. Firms in the largest size class ($100,000,000 and over)
experienced a substantially greater velocity increase during 1946—5 7
(5.9 per cent per year) than did firms in any other category; in fact,
this was the oniy size class whose velocity rose more rapidly than
aggregate corporate velocity. Moreover, in the two largest size
classes, velocity rose from 1939 to 1943, as well as from 1943 to
1946; in all other classes it fell in the earlier period, and the rate of
decline was inversely related to asset size. As a result of both the
wartime and the postwar convergence of size-class velocities, veloc-
ity in the largest class was 88.8 per cent of that in the smallest class
in 1957, compared with only 27.5 per cent in 1939. It should also be
noted that velocity has not risen significantly since 1950 for firms
in the three smallest size classes.
In general, smaller firms tend to have higher velocity than larger
firms, although this is not evident among the smallest classes (less
than $1,000,000 total assets) in recent years. The differences ex-
hibited in Chart 6 are not so great as those among industries (Chart
4), a fact which suggests that size may be less important than in-
22. Op. cit., chap. 4. Lutz's Chart 11 shows ratios of average cash balances to estimated
annual cash payments for two samples of corporations: 46 large manufacturing firms,
1915—43, and 103 medium-sized and small manufacturing firms, 1916—42. Throughout
1916—42 the smaller firms had higher velocity.
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dustry as a determinant of business velocity. However, these differ-
ences among size classes exist even within particular industries, as
Table A-12 indicates.24 Within each of four industries, smaller firms
have tended to maintain higher velocities than larger firms. This
finding strongly supports the view that the velocity differences
shown in Chart 6 for all non-financial corporations are genuinely
the result of firm size and not merely a reflection of varying indus-
trial composition among size classes. In chemicals and motor vehi-
cles (Table A-12) velocity behaved much the same as for all non-
financial corporations; in particular, it rose more in the largest size
class than in any other, and most markedly since 1950. Transpor-
tation and retail food trade, however, provide contrasts to the gen-
eral pattern. In the former the sharpest velocity rises occurred in
the intermediate classes; only moderate rises in the largest classes,
and little change since 1948 in the smallest classes. Retail food trade
velocity declined in all size classes during 1950—55—somewhat more
for large, than for small, firms.
At the end of 1957, firms in the largest size class held about one-
third of all non-financial corporate cash (Table A-il). This pro-
portion has grown slowly since 1946, exerting moderate downward
pressure on aggregate corporate velocity. However, there were de-
clines in the shares of the $5,000,000—$l0,000,000 and $10,000,-
000—$30,000,00o groups. As a result, the net impact of weight shifts
on the trend of corporate velocity has been very minor: the aggre-
gate figure is virtually the same whether 1946 or 1957 weights are
applied to the 1957 size-class velocities.
IV. WHY VELOCITIES DIFFER AT ANY POINT IN TIME
In Section III we noted persistent differences in velocity from
sector to sector, those among corporate size classes being particu-
larly striking. There appear to be several reasons for these differ-
ences.
DIFFERENCES AMONG CORPORATE SIZE CLASSES
1. Inadequate velocity measures.—Our measures of corporate ve-
locity include neither capital expenditures nor financial payments.
Both give rise to a demand for money, and their omission results in
an understatement of corporate velocity. Insofar as large firms en-
24. The industries included in these tables are chemicals, motor vehicles, transporta-
tion, and retail food trade. They were selected for their quantitative importance, ade-
quacy of representation in all size classes, and absence of major reclassifications during
1946—57.